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What Greenspan Got Right

He knew good central bankers should believe their eyes as much as their trendlines.
Karl Smith /
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Editor’s Note: Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan passed away on June 22 at the age of 100. Greenspan led the Fed from 1987 to 2006. Last month, Karl Smith looked at the important role Greenspan played in the tech boom of the 1990s.


Welcome to Dispatch Markets! For most folks today, the name Alan Greenspan, if they recognize it at all, evokes the free-market absolutism that was in vogue at the turn of the 21st century, as well as the devastating financial crisis that brought that era of thinking to an end. I can accept that. There is more than a little truth even in that simplified narrative. All the same, it's worth remembering that he was not nicknamed “the Maestro” for nothing. 

We are in the midst of a technological race with China that may determine the fate of the free world. We must remember how the U.S. cemented its lead in the first place if we are to retain it. And that will require a bit of rehabilitation of Greenspan and the boom he helped make possible. 

Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman from 1987 through 2006, got many things right. The most important among them was that he understood that macroeconomic data are, at best, backward-looking, and that good central bankers should believe their eyes as much as their trendlines. It was that insight that led Greenspan to support the nascent productivity boom in the ’90s and set America on a path to the tech dominance we enjoy, for now. 

At the start of the 1990s, American technological leadership was real, but the U.S. was not yet the undisputed tech behemoth that it would soon become. Japan was the quintessential high-tech society, rapidly accelerating its competitive advantage across all types of consumer electronics. Europe had its own champions in telecommunications, Ericsson and Nokia, that seemed poised to control the emerging mobile phone sector. 

At the time, it would have been impossible to associate the ’90s with exuberance. By 1992, the United States was emerging from Operation Desert Storm and the 1990–91 recession that followed. The mood of the country was anxious, consumed by worries over both the fiscal and trade deficits. Corporate restructuring was all the rage. Only 10 percent of Americans felt the U.S. economy was good or excellent, compared to the 53 percent who felt it was poor. Those are the worst numbers ever recorded outside of a recession. 

Economists at the time mostly accepted that the Federal Reserve’s job was to manage the economy. The Fed’s official mandate from Congress is to “promote the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates effectively.” In practice, that means lowering interest rates when unemployment is high and inflation is falling, and raising them when unemployment is low and inflation is rising.

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In theory, lowering interest rates increases the incentive for businesses to invest and households to purchase big-ticket items like cars and houses. This increase in spending causes the economy to “heat up,” economist-speak for falling unemployment and rising inflation pressures. Raising interest rates does the reverse. Businesses curtail investment, households consolidate debt, the economy cools, and, in theory, inflation pressures subside, while unemployment stabilizes or starts to rise. 

There are two problems with that theory. The first is that inflation and unemployment don't always move in perfectly opposite directions. The second is that you’ll note the theory is full of weasel words like “pressures” and “stabilize.” Both problems highlight the inexactitude of monetary policy as a science. Yet, economists had at least developed a solution of sorts to the first problem. That solution was called the Taylor Rule. 

The Taylor Rule is an equation that takes in measures of unemployment and inflation and spits out the ideal interest rate. Sounds nice. But alas, the Taylor Rule runs afoul of the second problem. Using a single equation collapses all the nuance about heating and cooling, or pressures and stability, that economists were so insistent on building into their theories. The Taylor Rule includes an inflation variable. But there is no numerical input that captures the squeeze a business owner feels when input costs are rising, but she doesn’t want to raise prices before her competitors do. 

The only mechanism for accounting for those nuances is the Fed’s judgment. Technically, Federal Reserve decisions to raise or lower interest rates are made by the 12 members of the Federal Open Market Committee. In practice, for decades, the decision was made by the chair, with other members providing at most one or two "protest votes" against the chair’s recommendation.

In 1992, the chair was Alan Greenspan, and the Taylor Rule said that interest rates were just right. Greenspan, however, was a firm believer in what economist Robert Barro had termed “casual empiricism.” Casual empiricism is the art of looking out of your window and taking seriously what you see. What Greenspan saw was an economy that was far from fine. 

The Taylor Rule implied that unemployment had fallen sufficiently and that if the Fed lowered rates further, inflation pressures would begin to build. Greenspan saw an economy in the midst of what was nicknamed “the jobless recovery.” He saw businesses that seemed timid to invest and households that thought the economy was in the dumps. 

Even more importantly, Greenspan was a fan of economist Bob Solow's quip that, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” He quoted it often, and if rumors are to be believed, he frequently inserted one or more expletives to drive home his point. 

Greenspan’s point was that, since the mid-1980s, computers had become increasingly important in the economy. Yet the productivity statistics over that period were tepid at best and negative at worst. At the same time, the standard inflation statistics showed prices rising 3 to 4 percent a year, but electronics prices were falling steadily. The statistics and the view from his window didn’t add up, and Greenspan figured that the fault lay with the stats. 

And so the Greenspan Fed continued to cut rates through 1992 and held them low throughout 1993. Unemployment began falling in March 1992 and continued to decline. By the end of 1993, unemployment was approaching levels that economists considered sustainable. Economists believed that the natural churn of the economy would leave roughly 6 percent of workers unemployed at any given time. Thus, 6 percent unemployment represented the “maximum employment” the Fed was tasked to achieve. 

Reluctantly, Greenspan began raising rates in 1994. Unemployment continued to fall, eventually dropping below 6 percent by September. At this point, the standard economic story suggested that rising inflation was almost inevitable absent a sharp rise in interest rates. But Greenspan raised rates slowly and steadily, even as unemployment fell further and further below 6 percent. 

Then, in early 1995, when the unemployment rate jumped from 5.4 to 5.8 percent, Greenspan reversed course and began another round of interest rate decreases. For the next four years, he kept interest rates in a tight band, between 4.75 and 5.5 percent. Asset prices soared over this period, with the S&P 500 more than tripling in value between 1994 and 2000.

Greenspan himself was concerned about the dramatic increase in stock prices and warned of “irrational exuberance” as early as 1996. Nonetheless, he resisted raising interest rates so far as to choke off the steady decline in the unemployment rate. By 2000, unemployment had fallen to 3.9 percent. 

The economy was able to sustain such low interest rates in part because, as Greenspan had predicted, productivity roared higher. From 1990 to 1995, productivity growth had barely averaged 1.5 percent a year. In 1996, productivity grew by over 2 percent and continued to rise throughout the decade, reaching 4.2 percent in 1999. 

Now, at this point in the story, someone always brings up Pets.com, the online pet-supply retailer with a $400 million valuation, a Super Bowl ad featuring its sock-puppet mascot, and a business plan centered around offering free shipping on 40-pound bags of dog food to consumers who could pick up the same thing quicker and easier at their local supermarket. (The company went bankrupt nine months after its IPO.) So, to be fair, the hunger to invest in anything remotely related to the internet did result in more than a few unproductive ventures. But the ecosystem that the investment produced has proven enormously productive. 

First, note that despite both the dot-com crash and the recession following 9/11, labor productivity continued to grow above 2 percent through 2003. The average yearly increase from 1996 to 2003 was 3.31 percent. All in all, the U.S. economy was 15 percent larger by 2003 than it would have been without the productivity surge. 

Second, as is well known, the Magnificent 7 stocks—Alphabet (Google), Apple, Meta, Nvidia, Amazon, Microsoft, and Tesla—today account for a third of the S&P 500's market capitalization. Slightly less well-known is that those seven companies alone exceed the combined market capitalization of the European Union and Japan. Of those seven companies, five were founded in Silicon Valley and the other two in Seattle. 

The U.S.’s current dominance in artificial intelligence can be traced back to the investment boom enabled by Greenspan’s skepticism of official statistics and standards during a turning point in the economy. We now face a similar position. Rather than unemployment falling to record levels, we have a stubbornly high consumer price index that seems stuck above the Fed’s 2 percent target. And the Fed seems biased toward raising rates. 

Yet, if we look out our window, we see an economy where AI is everywhere but in the productivity statistics. The entire software development industry, home to some of our most dynamic companies, has undergone a radical change overnight. Programming is now done almost exclusively using AI. There is every reason to believe this rapid productivity growth will spread to nearly half of all U.S. jobs.

Moreover, the cost of AI capability is dropping at rates too rapid to measure. The best analysis suggests that, depending on the benchmark, the price of a given level of AI performance has fallen by 9-fold to 900-fold per year. It's implausible that our current statistics accurately account for these rapid changes. 

The pace of growth, however, will be influenced by borrowing costs. The AI economy will require trillions of dollars in data center investment. Up until now, Silicon Valley has been able to more or less self-finance the AI buildout. That era will come to an end sometime this year. Companies will increasingly have to turn to the markets to finance future growth, and the cost of that financing will depend on where the Federal Reserve sets interest rates. Let’s hope new Chairman Kevin Warsh has the wisdom to follow the Maestro’s playbook.

Markets FTW

Texas is on track to surpass California in battery storage capacity. The famously fossil-fuel-friendly state hasn’t relied on mandates or state incentives, but on the magic of the market. This is what happens when people can just build things.

Texas is the land of oil wells, natural gas liquefaction plants, and a political culture that has traditionally treated green-energy moralists with open contempt. Texas has its own power grid in large part to protect the interests of the oil industry. But that single state grid, in a state that committed to growth, means that permits come more easily, interconnection queues are shorter, and the development of all forms of energy capacity exceeds what can be obtained in a heavily regulated, even if climate-friendly, state.

Chart of the Week

Liberal teens are turning away from marriage, and no one knows why. The usual suspect for all things youth and dysphoric is smartphones. More time online means less demand for in-person connections. But do conservative teens really spend less time on their phones? Perhaps this is another example of ideological sorting, where marriage-inclined teens explicitly identify as conservatives. Even so, that doesn’t explain the current extent of the decline among liberals.

# Alt Text Two line charts compare marriage expectations among high school boys and girls from 1980 to 2020, stratified by political ideology (conservative, moderate, liberal, and don't know/none), revealing that liberal students of both genders show significantly lower anticipation of marriage compared to their conservative and moderate peers.

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Karl Smith is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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