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Central Planning Never Works—Even in the Energy Industry

Central Planning Never Works—Even in the Energy Industry

Why Trump’s invocation of the Defense Production Act to boost fossil fuel production is doomed to fail.
Philip Rossetti /

Welcome to Dispatch Energy! Are government interventions the solution to high energy prices? The Trump administration’s recent invocation of the Defense Production Act marked an expansion of the ways in which the White House partners with the private sector to get things built. But this growing involvement is a double-edged sword that could make companies more skittish about entering the market.

A perhaps underappreciated reason for the West’s triumph in the Cold War is what the Soviets referred to as “electronic imperialism.” This concept was not some cunning plan by Western governments to infiltrate Soviet states, nor was it part of the period’s many bloody proxy wars. Rather, the term described the enormous challenge the Soviet Union faced in restricting people’s exposure to Western radio and television, which throughout the 20th century gave citizens insight into the higher standard of living enjoyed by countries outside of the Soviet sphere.

Put simply, people living under communism recognized its many failures through these glimpses into capitalist success stories. The practical lesson is difficult to ignore: Central planning is terrible at producing economic flourishing. Yet today, Washington is inexplicably looking to this model in energy policy. Amid high oil prices that politicians fear will rise further with the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz, there is a particular attraction to further utilizing laws that could force desired production outcomes.

I am referring to the esoteric 1950 law known as the Defense Production Act (DPA), which President Donald Trump invoked on April 20 in an aim to boost the production of fossil fuels and grid-related infrastructure. For the uninitiated, the DPA is a Cold War-era legislation that granted the president broad authority to intervene in markets if doing so was in the interest of vaguely defined “national defense.” Following amendments to the law in 1991, a fund that the president can use at his discretion was established. The thinking behind the DPA was that if the Cold War turned hot, the U.S. would be prepared to nimbly shift to a wartime economy—something it struggled to do in the early days of World War II.

Over the decades, the law has been used minimally and often sensibly. It originally granted several authorities that enabled the president to intervene in markets, many of which lapsed without use and were later rescinded by Congress (the authority to control wages, for example). But two broad categories remain: Title I authorities permit the president to prioritize contracts that businesses must accept, and Title III allows the president to provide financial incentives to increase the production of resources. Title I is used all the time, and without much fanfare. It makes sense that if the military needs a new aircraft carrier, the government can prioritize steel allocation for that purpose over, for example, the manufacturing of shopping carts. But it is in the so-called Title III powers that we start to see some problems.

Under Title III, the president can spend a relatively small amount of money via the Defense Production Act Fund (usually limited to $750 million per year, unless Congress appropriates more) to increase output. This capital amounts to a de facto subsidy that the president can use largely at his discretion, though there are some limitations. Title III compensation must reflect market rates, the president must prove that the intervention is the most sensible policy and that the market cannot fulfill the need, and he must notify Congress of his actions. Unless, that is, he doesn’t want to. Under the law, the limitations on the president’s actions under Title III can be waived “during a period of national emergency declared by Congress or the President; or upon a determination by the President … that action is necessary to avert an industrial resource or critical technology item shortfall.”

That is one doozy of a clause. There’s no official list of times this exemption has been invoked, but it was used by former President Joe Biden on several occasions as well as by Trump even before last month’s use. Biden’s initiatives included boosting critical minerals, solar power modules, transformers, fuel cells, insulation, and electric heat pumps. Under Trump, the DPA carve-out has been used to incentivize the production of critical minerals (again), coal, petroleum production and refining, grid infrastructure, energy-related infrastructure, and natural gas. 

Returning to the lessons of the Soviet Union, the conventional economic theory for why central planning (i.e., government determining what is produced and what is not) fails boils down to two big things: The limited information policymakers operate under, and the failure to appreciate opportunity costs. On the first point, no policymaker—no matter how smart—operates with perfect information. It is just not possible for a government official to steer investment more efficiently than when decisions are dispersed to the multitude of people who hold the capital—a concept called the “knowledge problem.”

The second point is that policymakers regularly fail to appreciate opportunity costs. Governments don’t spend money; they spend other people’s money. Every dollar the government spends is one that the original holders of capital can no longer direct toward something that would have offered them more utility than the government’s investment. Even if the DPA “succeeds” in boosting production of a targeted resource, the missing part of the equation is what production was lost elsewhere in the economy.

These dual concepts are the reason capitalist Western nations vastly outstripped the Eastern European nations in terms of living standards. Profit motivations and the free flow of capital naturally incentivize investors to remedy scarcity, as they can only make money by selling a good or service. By contrast, centrally planned Soviet economies relied heavily on concepts like “five-year plans,” in which the government would identify scarcity and allocate resources to production. The difference between these two approaches is that under a capitalist system, the ones making investment choices also bear the risk of failure, while communism concentrates those decisions within a political class that is insulated from consequences. 

Communists believed their system was fairer and more efficient, but in practice, it led to the notorious state of perpetual scarcity that befell residents who lived on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Meanwhile, capitalist nations saw large growth in the industries consumers valued—leading to the famous 1989 photograph of then-Soviet representative Boris Yeltsin awed by frozen fudge popsicles, which became an unintended icon of Western abundance. 

In applying these lessons to the DPA, we see that its invocation relies on the same premises that were proven flawed for the Soviet states. Politicians in Washington operate with limited information, and deploying the law necessarily means diverting resources from other potential investments. In theory, using the authority to put investment decisions in the hands of policymakers will end poorly.

But more important than theory are results. There hasn’t been much research on the DPA, but it was used aggressively to increase the availability of ventilators during the pandemic. This effort offers a perfect case study to evaluate if, perhaps, the DPA can work for us in a way that similar policies have failed.

At the onset of the pandemic, hospitals in the United States had an estimated 62,000 ventilators and the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile had another 14,000 to 20,000. The DPA was invoked to purchase 200,000, which would have more than doubled the supply. But by the end of the pandemic, the number of ventilators per hospital had only increased by 31.5 percent. Additionally, it is estimated that only about half of the ventilators purchased under the DPA were suitable for treating acute respiratory illness, and only a tenth were suitable for intensive care units.

Ultimately, the nation’s big foray into using the DPA to rapidly bolster production during a time of crisis—as it was designed to do—was a dud. As is repeatedly demonstrated, government workers who face no consequences for making bad investment decisions are more likely to make bad investment decisions than people with skin in the game.

The arguable justification for using DPA for an economic purpose is that some industries essential to national security may not be attracting enough investment to meet security needs. But when it comes to the energy sector, this argument is tenuous at best. When Biden was using the DPA for solar power, it was already the fastest-growing source of energy in the nation. Similarly, Trump’s recent application of the law comes at a time when energy prices are extraordinarily high, making it unlikely that industries like petroleum or natural gas are having a hard time finding cash.

But the bigger problem is that repeated reliance on the DPA shifts business incentives away from producing utilizable goods and services, and instead toward becoming part of an elite political class that can secure Washington’s blessings (and avoid its curses). This dynamic is why I’ve called the law the “Pandora’s Box of bad policy.”

Unfortunately, there is some evidence that my pessimism is not entirely unfounded. Investments in lobbying are way up across sectors, with $5.08 billion spent on lobbying last year—a 15 percent jump from $4.4 billion in 2024. For energy and natural resources in particular, lobbying has been on an upward trajectory in recent years, with $485 million spent in 2025 compared to $335 million in 2021. My last installment of Dispatch Energy noted that energy production has not increased as much as expected, and the administration’s invocation of the DPA is itself a tacit admission that the White House is not happy with the performance of the fossil fuel industry thus far. 

In a nutshell, central planning exercises like those the DPA facilitates have a poor track record both within and outside the United States. And there is also evidence that reliance on government interventions in industries is empowering rent-seekers, as demonstrated by rising lobbying expenditures. 

Ultimately, if the U.S. wants to lower energy costs, it needs to let investors either find the best ways to increase production or let consumers find ways to use less energy. Doing either requires the political discipline to let price signals and the market do their thing. Alternatively, concentrating production decisions within a political class and empowering central planning never ends well.

Policy Watch

  • Republican Rep. Bruce Westerman, the chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee, introduced a bill last year to update the Endangered Species Act. The bill aims to modernize many statutes that are vague or have contributed to delays in project development. Proposed amendments include limiting court-awarded compensation to advocates who litigate ESA statutes and setting clearer criteria for delisting recovered species. Naturally, efforts to reform such a prominent conservation law have drawn criticism from interested groups, with the Sierra Club describing the bill as one that would “gut” the ESA amid their concerns that the reform would lengthen the time to add new protected species. Earlier this month, the bill was pulled from a planned floor vote, indicating that modifications will be needed before House of Representatives leadership will allow a wider vote on it.
  • Helium supply risks are beginning to manifest in markets. Two-thirds of the global supply of the gas—a nonrenewable resource that cannot be commercially produced and is used to produce semiconductors and for medical imaging—comes from Qatar, meaning most helium shipments must transit the Strait of Hormuz.

Innovation Spotlight

  • Artificial Intelligence data centers are starting to enter the “carbon dioxide removal” markets. Carbon removal technology—unlike carbon offsets, which avoid emissions from other sources—aims to make activities carbon neutral by directly funding the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Last week, Axios reported that the Japan-based company NTT Data plans to purchase carbon removal credits from the carbon removal firm Climeworks. While carbon removal is more certain to produce a benefit than offsets, it is also a much more expensive technology, often costing hundreds of dollars per ton of carbon dioxide removed. The recent announcement shows that at least some AI firms flush with capital view the environmental benefits and publicity as worthwhile.

Further Reading

  • Is the war in Iran starting to worsen inflation? Conventional wisdom is that higher energy costs have impacts beyond direct energy expenditures, but Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the president of American Action Forum and former head of the Congressional Budget Office, checked the data last week to glean some insight. His short analysis for the Daily Dish summarizes the latest expenditure data quite well, but the short story is that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is putting extraordinary pressure on the price of durable goods. This will introduce yet another factor for the Federal Reserve to consider in its now yearslong effort to restore inflation to its target rate.

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Philip Rossetti is a contributor to Dispatch Energy and Vice President of Environment, Innovation, and Transportation at Lighthouse Energy Institute.

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